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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 13-1756 
______________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
JONATHAN TRIMINIO, 
 
        Appellant 
______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Crim. No. 2-12-00698-001) 
Honorable Katherine S. Hayden, District Judge 
______________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 8, 2013 
 
BEFORE:  FUENTES, GREENBERG, and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: October 23, 2013) 
______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
 This matter comes on before this Court on an appeal from a judgment of 
conviction and sentence entered on March 13, 2013, on the basis of appellant Jonathan 
Triminio’s plea of guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to a single count of unlawful 
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possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  The 
District Court sentenced Triminio to a 73-month custodial term to be followed by a three-
year term of supervised release.  The Court calculated that Triminio had a final offense 
level of 25 with 8 criminal history points, making an advisory sentencing range of 84 to 
105 months.  The offense level included a 4-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 
2K2.1(b)(6)(B) for unlawful possession of body armor. 
 Triminio appeals only from the use of this enhancement in calculating his offense 
level as he claims that its use violated his due process rights because he was not 
convicted of a body armor offense and he did not stipulate that he had possession of body 
armor.  He principally relies on Alleyne v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2151 (2013), United 
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005), Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 
296, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004), and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348 
(2000).  He does not contend, however, that, in terms, the enhancement could not be 
applied to his possession of body armor, though he does contend that his plea agreement 
did not contemplate the use of the enhancement in the calculation of his sentencing level.   
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 and we have 
jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Although, here, as in most 
cases, we exercise an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing a sentence, Triminio 
contends that the District Court erred as a matter of law by including the 4-level body 
armor enhancement in calculating his offense level and thus, to the extent of considering 
that argument, we exercise plenary review. 
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 We will affirm.  Triminio complains that the District Court, by finding as a fact 
that he had possession of body armor, violated the rule that he contends that the cases he 
cites established.  But clearly the Court did not violate the principles recognized in those 
cases.  Although possession of body armor could have been charged as a separate offense 
so that if a jury convicted him of that offense he could have been sentenced for its 
commission, the government did not make any such charge.  Rather, the government 
referred to the body armor only as a basis for enhancement of Triminio’s guidelines 
offense level and, in doing so, in no way permitted an increase in the statutory sentence 
that could have been imposed on him or in any other way affected any mandatory 
minimum or maximum sentence applicable to him.  Here the maximum sentence – with 
or without the 4-level enhancement – was ten years and the enhancement did not increase 
any mandatory minimum that the Court was obliged to impose.  Accordingly, the Court 
by the use of the enhancement simply increased the advisory but not binding sentencing 
range to which Triminio was subject.  Thus, United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 559 (3d 
Cir. 2007) (en banc), which held “that facts relevant to the advisory United States 
Sentencing Guidelines need not be submitted to a jury” is controlling here and we are 
constrained to affirm. 
 We make three additional comments.  First, as we noted above, Triminio relies on 
the very recent case of Alleyne v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2151 (2013).  But that case 
holds that “any fact that increases the mandatory minimum [sentence for an offense] is an 
‘element’ [of the offense] that must be submitted to the jury.”  Id. at 2155.  Thus, it is the 
counterpoint to Apprendi which held the same thing with respect to increases in the 
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statutory maximum sentence for an offense.  But Alleyne, like Apprendi, is not applicable 
here because the body armor enhancement did not increase any mandatory minimum 
sentence to which Triminio was subject.  Second, we see nothing in the record that in any 
way made it unfair for the District Court to use the enhancement in calculating his 
offense level.  To the contrary when the Court calculated his sentencing range it acted 
consistently with the provisions of Triminio’s plea agreement. 
 Our final comment is that if Triminio is correct it is difficult to understand how a 
district court ever can make a finding that is the basis for a guidelines sentencing level 
enhancement.  It is ironic that Triminio is making his argument in a case in which he does 
not even claim that the District Court erred in its finding that he possessed body armor as 
he does not deny being in possession of it. 
 For the foregoing reasons the order entered on March 13, 2013, will be affirmed. 
